Multiple Encryption
1. Why Encrypt Twice? (Motivation from DES's Death)
DES's 56-bit key fell to brute force ( average, EFF 56 hours), but DES hardware was everywhere — replacing it overnight was impossible. Multiple encryption reuses the DES circuit 2–3 times with independent keys to stretch effective strength without new hardware. Question: does double security to ? Answer: NO for double (meet-in-the-middle), YES-ish for triple (Topic 4).
2. Double Encryption and Meet-in-the-Middle (Worked Attack)
Attacker with one known : compute for all (table A), compute for all (table B), match values — each match is a candidate (false positives filtered with a second pair). Cost: encryptions + storage — barely more than single DES's ! Effective strength , NOT .
Worked numbers: single DES brute force avg; double-DES MITM worst-case time + blocks memory ( bytes — infeasible storage in 1998, feasible-ish for agencies today, but time gain nil). Lesson: naive key-length addition fails against MITM; storage–time tradeoff kills double encryption.
3. Design Rules Multiple Encryption Teaches
- Encrypt-decrypt-encrypt (EDE): with collapsing to single DES (backward compatibility with legacy single-DES boxes) — the Triple-DES trick (Topic 4).
- Independent keys required: same key twice () gains nothing; related keys invite related-key attacks.
- More stages ≠ proportional gain: security grows only if the construction defeats MITM (odd stages: 3DES vs MITM with data — genuine gain).
- Modern answer: just use AES-128 (, one pass) instead of stacking broken ciphers — multiple encryption was a migration bridge, not a design goal.
Exam Points
- MITM equation + time / memory numbers — 5-mark numerical core.
- "Double DES ≈ single DES strength" conclusion with storage-time reasoning.
- EDE backward-compatibility logic (bridge to Triple DES).
- Modern lesson: AES replaces stacking.